Sat. May 18th, 2024

Prof. ST Hsieh

Director, US-China Energy Industry Forum

626-376-7460

[email protected]

August 31, 2023

This is an unprecedented election in the USA: in addition to the traditional US election process, there is also the on-going legal process against former US President Trump and gangs, Trump is the front runner of GOP candidate for the US presidency again in 2024. The timelines or events for the election by voters and legal processes in the court rooms are almost set. It is most unfortunate that politics and legal proceedings are so tightly meshed.

As of now, a rerun of Trump presidency or Trump II cannot be ruled out. In fact, if the votes were taken today, Trump would prevail over Biden. So, for Biden’s supporters, the only hope is that Trump would self-destruct in the court rooms before November 5, 2024. But Trump’s supporters would claim that the court proceedings interfered with the election process, thus the election would be invalid, and Trump should be the legitimate President again, no matter what voters would do on the election day. If January 6, 2021, is a lesson learned, what would the chance of a peaceful certification and a peaceful inauguration? Biden II would have to deal with a completely divided US in the next four years.

If Trump prevails in the ballot boxes on November 5, 2024, then not only US allies (they are Biden’s allies, from Trump’s perspective) but also US adversaries (they may not be Trump’s adversaries) need to wake up to Trump II. It is not the end of the world if Trump moves back to the White House, in January 2025. But the US “bureaucratic system” must be ready for Trump II’s retributions and house-cleaning efforts. It is not necessary that Trump is revengeful, rather Trump will work full time to keep himself staying in the White House forever. Otherwise, Trump will move to the jail house as soon as he leaves the White House in 2029.

Opinion:   US allies need to wake up to the Trump question

The implications for global institutions, international law and order and the predictability of a world superpower are stark

Bronwen Maddox AUGUST 29 2023

The writer is director of Chatham House, a think-tank

Of the two startling images that circled the globe last week, only one should prompt a foreign policy rethink for the UK and its allies: It is the police mugshot of Donald Trump that deserves more thought. Carefully posed (he chose to glower rather than smile under the combed sweep of his hair) and immediately circulated by his team as a symbol of his supposed martyrdom, it drove his poll ratings only higher. The image will dominate next year’s presidential campaign (in which he holds the overwhelming lead for the Republican nomination). US District Judge Tanya Chutkan on Monday set a start date of March 4 2024 for his federal criminal trial on charges of alleged election interference, one day before “Super Tuesday”, when Republican voters in more than a dozen states head to the polls to pick their nominee.

British foreign policy, like that in much of Europe and many democracies beyond, is based on the presumption that the US in some sense always remains the same. Its presidents, its policies, its wars of choice come and go. But America upholds the principle of international institutions even if it rails against some of them or funds them sporadically. It continues to pick up the giant’s share of the tab for Nato, above all.

Those assumptions are confounded if Donald Trump is elected again. His critics say that surely he would not win more support than in 2016, but President Joe Biden’s stumbles, literal and figurative, and the unpopularity of Kamala Harris as vice-president have left the Democrat vote vulnerable.

The UK’s spring statement of its foreign policy — the awkwardly named Integrated Review Refresh — discusses potential policy changes that might follow the election, but does not do justice to the implications of Trump II. His policies would be disruptive enough, but many are shared by other presidential candidates. On Ukraine, Trump has talked of “ending the war to stop the killings” and Ron DeSantis, the next closest contender, has been sceptical of continued US support. The US has supplied more equipment to Ukraine than Europe combined; Kyiv would struggle to hold its own without Washington.

On China, it is hard to know how Trump’s impetuosity while in office (he imposed harsh tariffs on Chinese exports) would respond to rising tension on Taiwan. But that goes for others, too; the sole instinct which Republicans and Democrats seem to share is antagonism towards Beijing.

The former president’s stance on artificial intelligence is harder to discern. Rishi Sunak’s global AI summit in early November is intended to show UK leadership on governance of the technology. That depends, however, on co-operation from the US, home to many of the tech giants. It is hard to deduce support for corporate regulation from Trump’s first term (or his fury at the legal cases against his companies). But these are just awkward policies — and the UK has not found the current administration easy on that front either. Biden ordered the precipitate exit from Afghanistan which upended 20 years of British efforts in that country. The Inflation Reduction Act, a subsidy of hundreds of billions of dollars for green technology, has been drawn up with blithe disregard for the way it will suck investment and manufacturing from US allies.

Dealing with Trump in the White House again would present problems on a different scale. In a second term, he would be a president who had denied the result of one election and rejected the legal process of being held to account for that. He would have an utterly different conception of America’s role in the world and the nature of its democracy at home, of the rule of law at home and abroad. And so would the US voters who elected him.

At that point, the US becomes, for its allies, a different country altogether. The implications for global institutions, for international law and order, for predictability of a world superpower are stark. That they are barely discussed in published foreign policy is perhaps because of concern about jeopardising current relationships. But the prospect of the US being led by a president who denies the principles of American democracy is likely enough that this is no longer a good excuse.

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